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Terrorism as a backfire process
Abstract
Terrorism is widely seen as an injustice, naturally enough because it is a blatant violation of human rights.
The reaction against actions that are perceived as unjust can be called 'backfire'. The concept of backfire
is an extension of Gene Sharp's political jiujitsu concept. The strange thing about terrorism is that it
seems designed to backfire. Look in turn at each of the five methods of inhibiting backfire. First is coverup. Terrorists commonly carry out their actions publicly and announce responsibility for them. They
expose their actions rather than covering them up. Second is devaluing the target. Usually terrorists have
lower status than their targets, especially when prominent citizens are targeted. The potential for
devaluing the targets of terrorism is not great. Third is reinterpreting the action. Terrorists seldom say that
there was not really a bombing or that the number of dead is exaggerated or that the attack was a
mistake. Fourth is using official processes to give the appearance of justice. Terrorists usually have no
access to courts, commissions of inquiry or other official processes for justifying their actions. Fifth is
intimidation and bribery. Terrorists can threaten those who criticize them, especially those in their own
milieu. But their ability to bribe targets and witnesses is limited. In summary, terrorists have limited
capacity to inhibit outrage about their actions. Indeed, they often go out of their way to magnify the sense
of outrage, for example by seeking media coverage. Therefore it is predictable that most terrorist actions
backfire against the terrorists. This analysis applies only to non-state terrorists, the ones that receive the
bulk of attention by governments and the media. The question remains why non-state terrorists often
behave in a way that is almost guaranteed to backfire. This chapter will analyze both state and non-state
terrorism using backfire analysis and spelling out implications for nonviolent resistance to and prevention
of terrorism.
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Terrorism as predictable backfire
On the face of it, terrorism seems to be an incredibly counterproductive method of action.1
When violent attacks are made against innocent civilians, the usual response is revulsion
and increased popular support for government
action against the terrorists and those associated with them. In short, terrorism is almost
guaranteed to backfire. This suggests the
motivation for terrorism may often be something other than effectiveness.
The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001
were a challenge to U.S. corporate and
military power but, rather than weakening the
United States, instead had the effect of generating enormous sympathy around the world for
the U.S. people and mobilizing U.S. public
opinion in favour of attacks on anyone held
responsible. The 9/11 attacks legitimized the
unleashing of U.S. military power in ways
previously only contemplated — including
attacks on groups not responsible for 9/11.
The same pattern can be observed time and
again in other terrorist incidents. Every
Palestinian suicide bombing gives greater
legitimacy to harsh policies by the Israeli
government. The spectacular attacks by Chechen rebels against the Russian people have
led to greater support for brutal methods used
by the Russian government in Chechnya.
This pattern has prevailed for a long time.
Uruguay used to be a model liberal democracy, known as the Switzerland of South
America. In the 1960s, as the economy stagnated and corruption worsened, the government was challenged by the Tupamaros, a leftwing revolutionary movement. The Tupama1. Caleb Carr, The Lessons of Terror (New
York: Random House, 2002), argues that all
forms of violence against civilians have been
counterproductive throughout history.

ros gradually escalated their tactics, eventually
engaging in urban terrorism including kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations. The
government used the Tupamaro attacks as a
pretext for heavy-handed repression, including
police searches, arrests, and torture. The
actions of the Tupamaros, rather than leading
to revolution, resulted in 1973 in the destruction of democracy and descent into repressive
military rule.2
In some cases, terrorism seems to be successful in achieving gains for oppressed
groups, as in Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland.3
But in such struggles, there was widespread
community support for the cause. The question
is whether terrorism as a tactic helped or hindered the cause. As discussed later, nonviolent
tactics may be more effective in achieving
goals with fewer casualties along the way.
Terrorism is widely seen as an injustice,
because it is a blatant violation of human
rights. What is both strange and striking about
terrorism is that it flouts all the techniques
usually used to dampen outrage over injustice
— in other words, it seems designed to backfire. Terrorism is widely perceived as unjust
and it is often intended to generate attention,
thus satisfying the two fundamental conditions
2. See, for example, Arturo C. Porzecanski,
Uruguay’s Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla
(New York: Praeger, 1973). After restoration
of representative government in 1985, the
Tupamaros became a political party. I owe this
example to Andrew Mack.
3. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York:
Random House, 2005), argues that most
suicide terrorism is part of campaigns with
instrumental aims. However, he does not compare terrorism, as a tactic, with alternatives.
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for backfire. Indeed, terrorism has been called
“communication activated and amplified by
violence.”4
Terrorism illustrates a very different backfire dynamic than the cases described in
previous chapters. In massacres, beatings,
dismissals, wars, and torture, perpetrators
normally do everything possible to reduce
outrage from their actions. But with terrorism,
all the usual rules are ignored. The whole point
is to generate shock and horror.
Look in turn at each of the five methods of
inhibiting outrage. First is covering up the
event. Terrorists commonly carry out their
actions publicly or announce responsibility for
them or both. Sometimes they even claim
responsibility for actions they didn’t carry out.
They expose their actions rather than covering
them up.
Second is devaluing the target. Usually
terrorists have lower status than their targets,
especially when prominent citizens are kidnapped or assassinated. The potential for
devaluing the targets of terrorism is not great.
If al Qaeda has used derogatory labels for the
victims of 9/11, these labels have no popular
acceptance.
Third is reinterpreting the event. Terrorists
seldom say there wasn’t really a bombing or
the number of dead was small or the attack
was a mistake. Indeed, they are more likely to
celebrate and exaggerate their attacks.
Fourth is using official processes to give the
appearance of justice. Terrorists usually have
no access to courts, commissions of inquiry,
panels of prestigious experts, or other official

processes for justifying their actions.5 Quite
the contrary: these processes are regularly used
against them, for example when alleged
terrorists are brought to trial.
Fifth is intimidation and bribery. The power
of terrorists to intimidate opponents and critics
— politicians, military forces, intelligence
agencies, journalists, ordinary citizens — is
seldom very great, as evidenced by the number
of citizens willing to publicly denunciate terrorists and their attacks. After the March 2004
Madrid train bombings, large numbers of
Spaniards joined public protests against the
bombings. On the other hand, terrorists are
usually more able to intimidate those who
criticize them from within their own milieu.
Finally, their ability to bribe targets and witnesses is limited.
In summary, terrorists have limited capacity
to inhibit repugnance resulting from their
actions. Indeed, they often go out of their way
to magnify the sense of revulsion, for example
by seeking media coverage. Therefore it is
predictable that most terrorist actions backfire
against the terrorists.
In the next section, I explore some possible
reasons for the persistence of non-state terrorism despite its poor record of instrumental
success. Then I use the same framework to
examine terrorism by states, which have a
much greater capacity to reduce disgust from
their actions. Finally, I look at the implications
for nonviolent responses to terrorism.
Why Terrorism by the Weak?
The question thus arises of why terrorists
behave in a way almost guaranteed to be
counterproductive. It is possible to identify
several explanations.

4. Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf,
Violence as Communication: Insurgent
Terrorism and the Western News Media
(London: Sage, 1982), 54. See also Brigitte L.
Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The
Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and
Counterterrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2002); Joseph S. Tuman, Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of
Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003).

5. Al Qaeda leaders have sought opinions from
Islamic scholars to justify their killing of
civilians, but the purpose of this seems mainly
for ideological support within the network.
(Note that the search for theological justification for killing is peculiar neither to terrorists
nor to Islam.)
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First, terrorism can be an expressive act,
rather than an instrumental one.6 It can be an
expression of resistance against humiliation or
degradation experienced, consciously or unconsciously, or an expression of revenge
against previous acts by the opponent. Expressive acts can serve emotional purposes even
when they are not effective in practical terms.7
Second, terrorism is a characteristically
masculine act.8 Nearly all terrorists are male.
The few female terrorists — such as some
Palestinian suicide bombers — are unusual
and often generate disproportionate attention.
Even when women are involved, men are
almost always the commanders, for example
the organizers of suicide bombings.
Males are far more likely than females to be
involved in all types of violence, not just
terrorism. Violence is seen by some — such as
Frantz Fanon, theorist of decolonization — as
a psychologically liberating act.9 This psychology is, in my view, largely masculine.
Third, some terrorists and observers believe
violence is an effective way of achieving their
goals. The belief in the potency of violence is
pervasive in many cultures, for example underlying news reports that concentrate on
violence and ignore low-profile nonviolent
action, in Hollywood movies where good guys
6. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God:
Why Religious Militants Kill (New York:
Ecco, 2004), 7, 282.
7. Thomas J. Scheff, Bloody Revenge:
Emotions, Nationalism, and War (Boulder,
CO: Westview, 1994), highlights the role of
unacknowledged shame in protracted conflict,
especially war.
8. Robin Morgan, The Demon Lover: On the
Sexuality of Terrorism (New York: Norton,
1989).
9. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth,
trans. Constance Farrington (New York:
Grove Press, 1963), 94: “At the level of
individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It
frees the native from his inferiority complex
and from his despair and inaction; it makes
him fearless and restores his self-respect.”
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use violence more effectively than bad guys,
and in history books that concentrate on wars
and governments. So, despite the dismal
record of terrorists in promoting their causes,
many of them assume violence on behalf of
their cause must be effective.
Fourth, terrorism can be used instrumentally to provoke counter-violence from the
state. If this counter-violence is seen as excessive — as it sometimes is — then this can
create more support for the cause espoused by
the terrorists. In other words, although terrorism backfires, it can lead to state repression
that itself backfires by generating greater
support for the cause. This sort of process,
spelled out in some writing on guerrilla
warfare, can be seen in many encounters, for
example in British military actions against
IRA terrorists and in Israeli military actions
against Palestinian terrorists. The military
actions are sometimes so excessive that many
civilians are humiliated, injured, or killed,
leading to greater support for the anti-government cause.10 After all, state terror is sometimes motivated by revenge rather than a
calculated assessment of benefits and costs.
Thus, sometimes, non-state terrorism, by
provoking an even greater state terror, has the
result that more people oppose the government. But a full assessment of terrorism in this
scenario should look at its costs — lives,
property damage, loss of civil liberties — as
well as its benefits, and should also look at
alternative routes to the same ends, as discussed later.
Fifth, terrorism can be part of a cycle of
violence that cements the role of leaders at the
expense of the success of the struggle. A
viable struggle using conventional, legal,
and/or nonviolent means can be derailed by a
terrorist campaign that gives greater power to
10. According to Alan Cullison, “Inside AlQaeda’s Hard Drive,” Atlantic Monthly 294
(September 2004), 55–70, internal communications of al Qaeda revealed that, “its aim was
to tempt the powers to strike back in a way
that would create sympathy for the terrorists”
(58).
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the terrorist leaders, most commonly when
violence provokes counter-violence. For
example, in Kosovo, there was a decade-long
nonviolent struggle for independence. But
after the Kosovo Liberation Army adopted
terrorist tactics, leading to counter-violence by
the Serbian rulers and then NATO intervention, the KLA gained leadership of the independence struggle.11
The other side of this dynamic is the value
to some government leaders when opponents
resort to violence. Every Palestinian suicide
bombing cements the position and policies of
Israeli leaders who take a punitive stance
towards Palestinian aspirations. In this context,
nonviolent struggle is a threat, which many
people believe is why the Israeli government
deported Palestinian nonviolence advocate
Mubarak Awad.
Some governments — operating either in a
calculating or an instinctive fashion — may
provoke or fail to prevent terrorism by their
opponents to both discredit the opponents and
cement the government’s own position. This is
a version of the process of using agents provocateurs to instigate or provoke violence in
protest movements in order to discredit them
and justify the use of state force against them.
More generally, conventional government
anti-terrorism policies, by killing, subjugating,
and humiliating members of oppressed groups,
seem ideally designed to foster the terrorism
they ostensibly seek to oppose. Violence on
both sides serves to polarize the population,
giving more power to leaders, whereas peaceful measures have a greater capacity to build
bridges between erstwhile opponents.
There are thus many possible reasons for
adopting terrorism, most of which have nothing to do with being effective in bringing
about social change.

attention by governments and the media.
States that exercise terror, in contrast, have a
much greater capacity to inhibit outrage: they
routinely cover up their actions, for example
by hiding the use of torture and by using death
squads and proxy armies12; they smear their
targets as criminals or terrorists; they say they
are protecting borders, dealing with crime, or
countering subversion, and claim that abuses
are aberrations; they often establish legal
processes for their actions to give the appearance of justice; and they can intimidate or
bribe those who might challenge or expose
their actions. So it is not surprising that state
terror, though it leads to vastly more deaths
and suffering than non-state terror, seldom
generates much public concern.
Consider for example the killings carried
out by the military in Indonesia in 19651966.13 The trigger for the launching of terror
was an alleged Communist Party coup attempt
against the left-wing Sukarno government,
though this explanation has been disputed. In
any case, the military action was justified as
necessary to defend the country against a
communist takeover. Western governments
largely supported this interpretation, and raised
little protest against the scale of killing. Those
targeted were labeled communists — some,
certainly, were members of the very large
Communist Party, but many were not — and
maligned as such. The killings thus constituted
what Chomsky and Herman call “constructive
terror,” namely for a “good cause” and against
a suitably stigmatized enemy.14

State Terrorism

13. Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings
1965–1966 (Melbourne: Centre for Southeast
Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990).

This analysis so far applies only to non-state
terrorists, the ones receiving the bulk of
11. Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo
(London: Pluto, 2000).

12. Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner,
eds., Death Squads in Global Perspective:
Murder with Deniability (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 2000).

14. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman,
The Political Economy of Human Rights,
Volume 1: The Washington Connection and
Third World Fascism (Montréal: Black Rose
Books, 1979), 205–17.
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Although the slaughter was not secret, there
was no systematic documentation of what
happened. Considering the vast scale of killing
— many hundreds of thousands of people died
— the events received relatively little international attention. This was a sort of de facto
cover-up. Legal processes were not deployed
against perpetrators of the slaughter, but
instead used to impose lengthy prison sentences on thousands of targets whose lives
were spared. It is hard to obtain evidence of
intimidation and bribery used to prevent
opposition, but it is reasonable to presume
Indonesians who protested against the killing
would have themselves become targets,
whereas those who cooperated might be
rewarded. Of course killing is likely to intimidate those who observe or hear about it.
Another example of state terror is Stalinism, in which many millions died in purges
and prison camps and as a result of forced
relocation and starvation. The scale of the
terror was hidden by pervasive censorship and
by disinformation, for example guiding
visitors through carefully staged tours that
gave the impression of a successful socialist
state.15 The victims of Stalinism were vilified
as reactionaries, members of the bourgeoisie,
traitors, criminals, mentally ill, and enemies of
the revolution. The whole process was
portrayed as one of building a socialist society.
Legal processes were established to give the
appearance of justice; show trials, in which
dissidents were induced to confess to antiSoviet crimes, were the visible face of false
justice.16 Internal opponents of the terror could
themselves become targets, whereas support15. Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims: Travels
of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union,
China, and Cuba 1928–1978 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1981).
16. Show trials were public and thus went
against the tendency to cover up terror. A
possible interpretation is that, for the state, the
benefit of formal legitimacy outweighed the
benefits of secrecy. Of course, in the show
trials the political motivation of the charges
was covered up.
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ers stood to gain. Fellow travelers from other
countries, who whitewashed the terror, could
expect to be received favorably by the Stalinist
regime. Thus, the Stalinist state was able to
use, with good effect, every one of the five
methods for reducing outrage from injustice.
On the other hand, these methods had little
effect on the most vocal opponents of Stalinism, anticommunists in the West, who were
unconvinced or unaffected by vilification of
victims, by Stalinist justifications, by show
trials, and by the potential for intimidation or
bribery.
The success of states in minimizing public
disgust and fury from their terrorist activities
is revealed in the great discrepancy between
the massive media coverage of non-state
terrorism and the scant attention to state
terrorism. Usually governments only condemn
state terrorism when perpetrated by certain
enemy states, as when the U.S. government
applies the label “rogue state.” The research
literature on terrorism follows the agenda set
by governments and the mass media, concentrating on non-state terrorism, with relatively
few treatments of state terrorism.17
17. This observation is documented in Edna O.
F. Reid, “Evolution of a Body of Knowledge:
An Analysis of Terrorism Research,” Information Processing and Management, 33
(1997): 91–106. I thank Steve Wright for
informing me of this reference. Treatments of
state terrorism include Chomsky and Herman,
Political Economy of Human Rights; Frederick
H. Gareau, State Terrorism and the United
States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on
Terrorism (Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 2004);
Alexander George, ed., Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Jeffrey
Ian Ross, ed., Controlling State Crime, 2d ed.
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers,
2000); Jeffrey Ian Ross, ed., Varieties of State
Crime and Its Control (Monsey, NY: Criminal
Justice Press, 2000); Michael Stohl and
George A. Lopez, eds., The State as Terrorist:
The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and
Repression (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1984);
Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds.,
Terrible Beyond Endurance? The Foreign
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Even the conventional definition of terrorism, as violence exercised by non-government
groups against civilians for political ends,
reflects the interests of states.18 A less onesided definition of terrorism, as violence
against civilians used for political ends, would
immediately identify states as the world’s
leading terrorists, through torture, warfare, and
the usual range of repressive tactics.19 The
very words “terror,” “terrorism,” and “terrorist” thus are political labels, typically directed
at opponents rather than used in a precise and
consistent fashion.20
Nonviolent Action as an Alternative to
Terrorism
Nonviolent action — including methods such
as rallies, vigils, strikes, boycotts, and sit-ins
— is usually far more effective than violence
in generating support and bringing about
desirable change. Consider for example a
peaceful protest against government policies.
If police beat or kill protesters, this can backfire against the government, as at Sharpeville,
Dili, and Dharasana. Consider each of the five
methods for inhibiting backfire.

Policy of State Terrorism (Westport, CT:
Greenwood, 1988).
18. This point is made emphatically by
Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network:
Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston:
South End Press, 1982).
19. Eric Markusen and David Kopf, The
Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide
and Total War in the Twentieth Century
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), point to
similarities between genocide and strategic
bombing. Similar parallels exist between
terrorism and warfare.
20. Conor Geerty, The Future of Terrorism
(London: Phoenix, 1997), gives a cogent
critique of the content of the term “terrorism”
as evolving from its origins as state terror to an
incoherent expression of condemnation.

• Many nonviolent actions are carried out in
public, so covering up attacks is not easy.
• When protesters dress conventionally and
behave moderately and respectfully — rather
than dressing unconventionally and behaving
aggressively — then it is difficult for the
government to devalue them.
• When protesters explicitly commit themselves to nonviolence and are open about their
goals and methods, it is more difficult for
governments to be convincing with alternative
interpretations.
• If, when activists come under attack, they
appeal directly to the public — including
allies, opponents, and third parties — they are
more likely to obtain support than by relying
on official channels such as making complaints about police misconduct.
• Nonviolent action is itself a stand in the
face of potential intimidation.
Contrasting each of these with the corresponding method when violence is used, it is
apparent that nonviolent action is far more
likely to build support.
One of the keys to backfire is that people
perceive violent attacks on peaceful protesters,
or against uninvolved civilians, as unjust. This
is the reason nonviolence proponents continually stress the importance of maintaining
nonviolent discipline.21 A breakdown in discipline — even a brief scuffle or some verbal
abuse — changes the nature of the interaction
and alters the perception of injustice when
police use violence. In contrast, bombings and
assassinations completely undercut this
dynamic.
Nonviolent action has a good track record
in liberation struggles.22 The Palestinian

21. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent
Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), 573–
655, includes “solidarity and discipline to fight
repression” as one of the stages in his
“dynamics of nonviolent action,” just before
political jiu-jitsu.
22. Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman,
How Freedom is Won: From Civic Struggle to
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Liberation Organization used terrorism for
years but with limited success. The spontaneous development of the first intifada in 1987
— an unarmed struggle rather than a purely
nonviolent struggle — was far more effective
in mobilizing support among Palestinians,
winning international sympathy, and splitting
Israeli public opinion. Arguably, a completely
nonviolent struggle would have been even
more effective.23 Instead, in the second
intifada, from 2000, suicide bombings have
weakened support for the Palestinian cause.
In apartheid South Africa, armed resistance
was fairly easily crushed by the state. Liberation occurred only after nonviolent action
became the main mode of struggle.24 Similarly, the East Timorese struggle for independence achieved success after the armed struggle
was subordinated to peaceful protest.25
The failures of armed struggle are legion.
Not only do many armed struggles completely
fail, but in many of those that led to independence — such as in Vietnam and Algeria — the
death toll was horrific.26 Furthermore, successful armed struggle is more likely to lead to a
centralization of power in the subsequent
government. Armed struggle is especially
ineffective against systems of representative
government: there is not a single successful
Durable Democracy (New York: Freedom
House, 2005).
23. Souad R. Dajani, Eyes Without Country:
Searching for a Palestinian Strategy of
Liberation (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1994); Andrew Rigby, Living the
Intifada (London: Zed Books, 1991).
24. Stephen Zunes, “The Role of Non-violent
Action in the Downfall of Apartheid,” Journal
of Modern African Studies, 37 (1999): 137–69.
25. Chisako M. Fukuda, “Peace through
Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese
Resistance Movement’s Strategy for Engagement,” Pacifica Review 12 (February 2000):
17–31.
26. Two or three million Vietnamese died in
the wars for independence and up to a million
Algerians.
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case of a revolutionary overthrow. This can be
understood in terms of backfire. Armed struggle has far greater legitimacy when used
against repressive and corrupt regimes.
Against a system based on the rule of law and
majority rule, violent opposition has far less
legitimacy. Indeed, it can be argued that a
potent way to reduce non-state terrorism is to
ensure realistic opportunities exist to work
through the system (including using nonviolent action) for progressive social change.27
Despite nonviolent action’s success record,
terrorism is still attractive to many for various
reasons, including those outlined earlier.
Nonviolence against Terrorism
I have argued that nonviolent methods are
usually far more effective than violent
methods in promoting beneficial social
change, because violence commonly leads to
reduced support and lower legitimacy. Therefore, one of the ways to reduce terrorism is to
convince those who are considering violence
as an option that nonviolent alternatives are
superior. This line of argument is most
relevant to reducing non-state terrorism, in
other words terrorism of the weak.
Opposing state terrorism is another matter,
because states have a vastly greater capacity to
reduce abhorrence from their own injustices.
The challenge is to make state terrorism backfire by countering each of the five standard
methods of inhibiting outrage. Countering
cover-up involves exposing state violence and
cruelty, for example through whistleblowing,
investigative reporting, courage of editors, and
alternative media. Countering devaluation can
27. Richard E. Rubenstein, Alchemists of
Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World
(New York: Basic Books, 1987), in a wellinformed assessment of the driving forces
behind terrorism — especially terrorism associated with social revolution and national
liberation — supports an anti-terrorism policy
that permits “young intellectuals to be reunited
through collective action with their people”
(236).
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be done through humanizing of targets, for
example through personal contact, speaking
tours, and human-interest stories. Countering
government interpretations — sometimes sincere, sometimes spin and lies — requires
ongoing efforts to communicate understandings from the point of view of victims and
critics. Countering the pacifying effect of
official channels — such as investigations that
whitewash what is happening — requires
trusting official procedures less and exposing
and discrediting processes that give a false
appearance of justice. Countering intimidation
and bribery involves refusing to be cowed or
co-opted and exposing attempts to intimidate
and bribe.
In the 1980s, the U.S. government was
involved in state terrorism in Central America
by assisting governments and paramilitary
groups that imprisoned, assaulted, tortured,
and killed opponents. The U.S. government
disguised its role by use of proxy armies —
notably the Contras in Nicaragua — and client
governments. It stigmatized opponents as
communists and terrorists and claimed all its
actions were in the interests of democracy.
Opponents in the United States came under
surveillance and were subject to disruptive
interventions by government agencies.
In opposition to this U.S. state terrorism in
Central America, many U.S. citizens joined
peace groups, which together became a powerful movement.28 One of the movement’s most
potent challenges to the government was
support for refugees from Central America,
often undertaken through church networks.
The stories told by these refugees to groups of
church people avoided government censorship
and media spin. When church people met
refugees face to face, the refugees became
flesh-and-blood humans rather than anonymous victims, thereby countering attempts at
devaluation. The refugees’ stories were a
direct challenge to the government’s interpretations of its policy. Seeing the way the law

was used against refugees helped to discredit
formal channels for justice in the eyes of
movement participants. Finally, the church and
associated personal networks provided support
for resisting government intimidation. The
Central America solidarity movement thus was
effective in countering each of the five
methods for inhibiting outrage from injustice.

28. Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The
U.S. Central America Peace Movement
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

• Reveal the value of nonviolence by
further studies of historical and contemporary
use of nonviolent action.

Conclusion
Terrorism, as a tool for bringing about a better
world, has remarkably poor prospects, even
when the cause being supported is a worthy
one. Examining the dynamics of outrage from
injustice leads to the conclusion that nonviolent action is usually far more effective than
violence in challenging repression and oppression. In spite of this, violence has a continuing
appeal to some challengers, for various
reasons including cultural assumptions, the
way violence serves to polarize populations
and cement the role of group leaders, and the
way violence by non-state groups serves to
justify state violence.
State terrorism also has a continuing appeal
to state elites, because it often achieves its
immediate ends, though seldom are these
supportive of values such as peace and
freedom. Because terrorism so often serves the
interests of powerholders in state and non-state
groups — almost always male dominated,
hierarchical, and secretive — it is unlikely
violence will be renounced any time soon.
Nonviolent action is a continuing challenge
to violent options, both as an exemplary alternative to non-state violence and as a method of
opposing state violence. Examining the five
main methods for inhibiting outrage over
injustice can offer guidance for nonviolent
campaigns, as shown by the example of the
Central America peace movement. It is also
possible to use this same approach to suggest
ways of highlighting how nonviolence is
superior to violence. This leads to the following five suggestions.

Terrorism as predictable backfire

• Counter devaluation of nonviolence practitioners by emphasizing their courage and
suffering and their unwillingness to harm
others.
• Counter interpretations of nonviolence as
passive and ineffective by documenting its
successes and documenting the failures of
violence.
• Avoid relying on government support for
promotion of nonviolent alternatives, and
avoid assuming that government initiatives —
sanctions, peacekeeping, peace plans, disarmament negotiations, treaties, laws — are
going to solve problems or, indeed, are intrinsically nonviolent.
• Refuse to be intimidated by critics of
nonviolence and refuse to be bought off by
opportunities within the mainstream.
The backfire framework offers a way of
analyzing tactics against injustice. In doing so,
it reveals the shortcomings of terrorism and
the strengths of nonviolent action. Nonviolent
action is both an alternative to non-state
terrorism, a method of challenging the social
conditions that can breed non-state terrorism,
and a method of challenging state terrorism. It
is thus a potent but neglected anti-terrorist
tool.29
29. See, generally, Tom H. Hastings, Nonviolent Response to Terrorism (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland, 2004). There are other ways that
nonviolent approaches can be mobilized
against terrorism. One is to replace large,
potentially dangerous technological systems,
such as large power plants, dams, and refineries, with small-scale decentralized systems,
such as energy efficiency and renewable
energy systems, thereby reducing the vulnerability of societies to terrorists. See Brian
Martin, Technology for Nonviolent Struggle
(London: War Resisters’ International, 2001).
Another is to replace the present intelligence
services, based on secrecy and centralized
control, with agencies that openly publish their
findings, thereby becoming more accountable
as well as more reliable. See Brian Martin,
“Nonviolence Versus Terrorism,” Social
Alternatives 21 (Autumn 2002): 6–9.
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